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tory, and still more so when it combines the most entertaining opposites. The prophet of the French Revolution, who rejoiced in the decay of tyranny, yet toadied Frederick the Great and endured the unsavory entanglements of the court of Berlin; who hated the *canaille* and was smothered in roses by the mob of Paris; who spent most of his life in preaching *écrasez l'infâme* and always (so he said) had a fever on St. Bartholomew's Day, yet who went regularly to mass at Ferney and put up a gallows on his land to show that he was *seigneur*: here is a subject still awaiting final delineation by a brush that should be more subtle and painstaking, but should not be less vigorous than that of Carlyle.

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THE MEANING OF TRUTH: A SEQUEL TO "PRAGMATISM." By William James. London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. xxii, 298.

This volume is in large measure a reprint, with minor changes, of various articles which the author has published on the meaning of truth, and their dates range from 1884 to December 3, 1908. The only important new contributions are three papers on "Abstractionism," "Two English Critics," and "A Dialogue." I for one wish to thank Professor James for making it easier to get an all-round view of his position. I have for many years been endeavoring to ascertain Professor James's standpoint on the subject treated in this volume, and although I had read carefully everything that is here reprinted I confess that I was not able to get a satisfactory view of the position as a whole. Whether I have now attained to this achievement remains to be seen, but at least I am glad to acknowledge that what till now have seemed to me,—will Professor James pardon the confession?—random excursions into the field of the problem resulting in no consistent accomplishment, at last have shown that they have been conducted on a thoroughly systematic plan. The final outcome of the single engagements taken together is that the general commands a strategic position with his forces marshalled about him in a formidable array, and he cannot be ousted by those who decline to meet him on his own ground, that of

appeal to actual experience. The reviewer thinks that the position has its weaknesses, but he purposes in this review first to give as objective account as he can of the position.

Professor James has made it abundantly clear that his view of truth in no wise commits him to subjectivism and that his opponents have entirely misunderstood him in charging him with this fault. This misunderstanding, he admits, had some excuse in the 'unguarded language' he had used in his "Pragmatism." There, he tells us, "I spoke of the truth of the belief of certain philosophers in the absolute. . . . I offered this as a conciliatory olive-branch to my enemies. But they, as is only too common with such offerings, trampled the gift under foot and turned and rent the giver . . . so all that I can do is to apologize, and take my offering back. The absolute is true in *no* way then, and least of all, by the verdict of the critics, in the way which I assigned!" (Pp. viii-x.) This undoubtedly clears the atmosphere, and while perhaps Professor James may not now sufficiently recognize that it invalidates the thesis of the chapter within which the retracted statements appeared, as that thesis was there stated, the retraction must of course by every fair reader be taken as throwing great light upon Professor James's present position. It seems as if Professor James's views had developed more than he suspects; but this is a question of history, and we are now engaged, not in tracing the development of Professor James's view of the meaning of truth, but in understanding what that view is now that it has developed. And, I repeat, it is unmistakable that the view is not subjectivistic. "The pragmatizing epistemologist posits there," *i. e.*, in the universe, "a reality and a mind with ideas" (p. 191). "If the reality assumed were cancelled from the pragmatist's universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre. This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' *ab initio* and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist" (p. 195).

Now, just as an idea taken by itself is nothing "but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendency about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being gradually followed by other pieces of

substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional experiences between" (p. 107), and therefore is devoid of truth, so on the other hand the reality with which it stands in the truth-relation, is when taken by itself also devoid of truth. "Realities are not *true*, they *are*; and beliefs are true *of* them" (p. 196). The denial therefore of actual truth antecedent to idea is not a denial of reality. It remains unshaken by the denial. We have then two kinds of 'entities' or pieces of substantive experience, the existence of neither of which is imperilled by the absence of truth from either.

Where then can truth be found? It could not be found if all experience were of substantive character; but "the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves" (p. xii). The "parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure" (p. xiii). And truth is just one of these directly experienced relations; it is one of the continuities that obtain within experience. "Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one hand, and a reality outside of the idea, on the other" (p. 163). "The truth of the idea is one relation of it to the reality" (p. 234). Any scientific account of truth must identify this relation, pointing out just what kind of experienced continuity is designated by the term, and the great merit which Professor James claims for his account is that it alone lays its finger on an empirical fact and says, "There you have truth right in your experience and can see just what it is. You do not have to go outside of your experience to get it. You do not have to posit an absolute transcending your individual experience to make your definition of truth march." The justice of this exclusive claim I do not wish to discuss here; I mention it merely to show that at least Professor James's conception of truth means to be a thoroughly empirical conception. That this is a merit, it seems to me, is indisputable; and that a defect at this point is fatal to any conception of truth must be granted by anyone who bases his philosophy on experience.

Now just what is the empirical continuity that constitutes the essence of truth for our author? An idea is true when it knows

its reality; when does this happen? An example will show. "Suppose me to be sitting here in my library at Cambridge, at ten minutes' walk from 'Memorial Hall,' and to be thinking truly of the latter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such an intrinsic difference in the image makes no difference in its cognitive function" (p. 104). This idea, at this stage of the experiential stream, is just an idea, neither actually true nor actually false. It is one of the entities whose experiential interrelation constitutes truth, but still this relation emerges in the living tissue of continuous experience; it simply is. "Certain *extrinsic* phenomena, special experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the image, be it what it may, its knowing office" (*ibid.*). As I understand this, the extrinsicality of the superadded phenomena is merely the fact that these phenomena are not yet there in the experience. It is not a logical but a temporal extrinsicality. The logical question of intrinsicity or extrinsicality, when taken up, carries us beyond the bare 'entity' of the initial idea. Logical intrinsicity is nothing but an abstract conception, having as its empirical basis the fact that the idea actually *does continue through intermediaries* into a terminating experience, and what makes logical intrinsicity an abstraction is that it ignores the intermediaries and seeks to connect the extremes in saltatory fashion (pp. 152-3). The denial of intrinsicity therefore is simply a denial, from the point of view of exact psychological description, of the presence of anything in this initial stage but just a mere flat piece of substantive experience; but this denial does not rest on a view of experience as disjointed. It is rather motivated by the conviction that conjunctivity is not found in any one term but obtains as an experienced continuum between terms. This continuum, however, is not a Democritean void between atomistic elements. Not only is it a continuum, but it is a plenum; and its filling consists of just more pieces of substantive experience, no piece cut off from its predecessor. Logic ignores the intermediate filling and yet maintains the continuum, which is impossible without the filling. Both the continuity and what is continuous are facts of experience, and neither must be left out of account in a concrete statement of the whole process.

But the continuity which constitutes truth is not just temporal continuity, as will appear immediately. "For instance," to

continue the quotation which we have interrupted to discuss the meaning of extrinsicality, "if you ask me what hall I mean by my image, and I can tell you nothing; or if I fail to point or lead you towards the Harvard Delta; or if, being led by you, I am uncertain whether the Hall I see be what I had in mind or not; you would rightly deny that I had 'meant' that particular hall at all, even though my mental image might to some degree have resembled it. The resemblance would count in that case as coincidental merely, for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one another in this world without being held for that reason to take cognizance of one another. On the other hand, if I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its presence I feel my idea, however imperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now terminated . . . why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That percept was what I *meant*, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and *fulfilled intention*" (pp. 104-5; italics changed).

But what does 'fulfilled intention' mean, if the original idea was a flat piece of substantive experience with nothing but *ex post facto* prophetic insight? Does this not seem to imply that there was already in addition to flat substantivity an objective reference also? The word 'intention' has not slipped in here as an isolated case of Homeric nodding. We read farther on: "Some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way. Others are felt to increase or to enlarge *their meaning*, to carry out *their purpose*, or to bring us nearer to *their goal*. They 'represent' them, and may fulfil their function better than they fulfilled it themselves" (p. 111; italics mine). What can be meant by a purpose or a meaning or a goal of an idea which was just itself, with no self-transcendence? This is the crucial question in Professor James's theory of truth. His answer seems to be given in these words: "Wherever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of *one direction followed*, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known" (p. 106). Again: "Pragmatists are unable to see what you can possibly mean by calling an idea true, unless you mean that between it as a *terminus a quo* in some one's mind and some particular reality as a *terminus ad quem*, such

concrete workings do or may intervene. *Their direction constitutes the idea's reference to that reality*, their satisfactoriness constitutes its adaptation thereto, and the two things together constitute the 'truth' of the idea for its possessor." (Pp. 237-8; I have shifted the italics in these two quotations.) This 'direction' cannot be just the temporal direction in which the future stands to the past; for some future experiences abolish antecedent experiences instead of continuing them in the same direction. Nor does the direction consist in movement from next to next along a line of resembling intermediaries, for resemblance, "although a fundamental function in knowing truly, is often dispensed with" (p. 41). It is not movement along satisfactory lines; for satisfactoriness, according to the above quoted statement, does not constitute the idea's reference to reality, which is its "direction," but satisfactoriness is the adaptation of the intermediate 'concrete workings' to the idea's reference. Here then in the 'one direction followed' by a continuously developing experience which leads from idea to its object we have a factor which is integral to Professor James's view of truth, but for which I can find no empirical warrant, unless Professor James were to allow me to search for it in the idea's own pointing which characterizes the idea from the start. But of course it cannot do that if the idea at the start is nothing but a flat piece of substantive experience. At times Professor James seems disposed to grant explicitly such a pointing character to the initial experience: "Whosoever feels his experience to be something substitutional even while he has it, may be said to have an experience that reaches beyond itself" (p. 114). Once grant that the experience within which the initial idea occurs may be an experience of the substitutional character of that idea, and the whole thing becomes clear. But what then becomes of the flat piece of substantive experience which the idea at the outset is said to be?

If Professor James were to modify his position somewhat here and distinguish between an image, which possibly may be a self-contained 'entity' in the sense of not pointing toward anything, and an idea, which is such an image, or any symbol, *experienced as substitutional*, and therefore experienced as pointing, then some of us at least could find ourselves able to start with him. But we find it impossible to grant that a subsequent experience, however conjunctively tied it may be to a previous flat piece of substantive experience, can be regarded as fulfilling that flat

piece's purpose when that piece was so flat that it could not have a purpose projected into a third dimension. Such a piece may be recognized subsequently as similar to subsequent pieces, but if it does not point, there can be nothing that is the goal of its direction. You might as well say that a village, because it lies in the direction pointed toward by a finger at a crossing, is what is meant by the uncharacterized part of the sign-board lying behind the sleeve. It seems to some of us that the question of truth does not arise till ideas claiming significance appear, and that an *ex post facto* attribution of truth to what was absolutely innocent of any intention to be truthful or false, imports, not clearness, but confusion into logical discussions. In this respect, Dr. Schiller's account of truth, starting from claims to truth, however unsatisfactory it may be in its further progress, is in advance of the view presented in "The Meaning of Truth."

The book is characterized by Professor James's usual felicity of expression. The lack of an index is a serious drawback to its usefulness.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI. By G. S. Brett. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. xlv, 310.

The aim of the author of this work is to give an account of the philosophy of Gassendi which will show the importance of that writer in philosophic thought. It is often said that Gassendi is unduly neglected, but Mr. Brett remarks that the statement is generally made without any clear indications of what is to be expected from the study of Gassendi's work. Mr. Brett seeks to justify closer attention to Gassendi by an able exposition of his teaching. He maintains that Gassendi is worthy of interest and endeavors to show wherein his importance lies. In the introduction a survey of ancient atomism is given and is followed by a slight sketch of Gassendi's life. The rest of the book falls into four parts, consisting of an exposition of Gassendi's views of logic, physics, and ethics, together with a general review which includes a discussion of Leibniz and Lotze. Mr. Brett's exposition follows closely the order of the "Syn-